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Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values and
Public Policy
Priscilla M. Regan
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995, 310 pp.

Reviewed by Colin W. Groundt
For years, the Clinton administration has been trying to pass
legislation to force computer manufacturers to install a "clipper
chip" in every computer sold in the United States. The idea is to
allow government agencies (particularly the FBI) unlimited access to
decode any information that has been encrypted (converted into
code) on a computer or on the network to which the computer is
connected. The government maintains that this device is necessary
for national security and safety reasons. Chief among the reasons
stated is the need to thwart the threats of terrorism, organized
crime, and the drug trade. Privacy rights advocates, Internet user
groups, and media organizations have vehemently opposed the
legislation. This battle is typical of the many privacy wars waged in
the United States. The battle lines are usually drawn between an
individual's right to privacy and the national interest in unrestricted
access to information.
Priscilla Regan moves away from this focus, suggesting it is too
simplistic. As she argues in Legislating Privacy, 1 privacy is not just an
individual value, it should also be a societal value. Once privacy is
viewed this way, legislation with implications for privacy will be
examined in relation to its effect on society, not just on individuals
who may have something to hide. A renewed focus on the
importance of privacy to society will not only provide ammunition
with which to fight government actions that jeopardize privacy
rights, but will also make it easier to pass legislation protecting
privacy.
t B.A. (Hons.) (Western), B.A.A. (Ryerson), LLB. anticipated 1999 (Dalhousie).
1 P. M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values and Public Policy
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
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The right to the protection of privacy is recognized in the
Constitution of the United States. In Warden v. Hayden,2 the
United States Supreme Court recognized the protection of privacy
as the principal objective of the Fourth Amendment. For a country
that has lived through Watergate and McCarthyism, it is no
wonder that privacy interests are given such prominence. What the
book illustrates, however, is that despite its position of supremacy in
law, it is still difficult to sell the nation's lawmakers on the
protection of privacy. Again, this is mainly because the principal
focus of the debate is centered around individual, rather than
societal, values. As Regan notes, there are a number of reasons why
individual privacy is a weak policy goal: "it emphasizes the negative
value of privacy; it establishes a conflict between the individual and
society; and it fails to take into account the importance of large
social and economic organizations."3
In order to successfully pass legislation limiting access to
personal information and, hence, in favour of individual rights,
Regan points out that representatives supporting the measures have
had to rely on personal stories or outside incidents to emphasize the
need for such legislation. She notes:
[T]he 1974 Privacy Act was in part a response to the
misuses of government information that was revealed
during the Watergate scandal; the 1978 Right to
Financial Privacy Act was a response to the Supreme
Court's 1976 ruling in the United States v. Miller that
bank records were the property of the banks and that
individuals have no property interest in those records; the
current attempt to strengthen the 1970 Fair Credit
Reporting Act can be attributed to the Business Week
report that one of its reporters easily gained access to the
credit history of the vice president; and the adoption of
the 1988 Video Privacy Protection Act followed a
Washington, D.C., paper's publication of a list of the
videotapes rented by Robert Bork, then a nominee for
the Supreme Court. 4
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Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Supra note 1 at 215.
Ibid. at 199.

BOOK REVIEWS

367

On a more tragic scale, she further states that the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act was only passed after "a California actress,
Rebecca Shaeffer, was stalked and murdered by a man who
obtained her home address from the [Department of Motor
Vehicles]."5
The book is advertised as the first in-depth political science
analysis of privacy-protection politics in the United States. It
certainly provides a detailed discussion of the issue, albeit limited
to a singularly American perspective. What it illustrates, in addition
to the battle between individual rights and the need for
information, is the quagmire of politics. The most common theme
running through all the chapters, despite their different focuses, is
the vast number of bureaucratic impediments to getting a proposed
piece of legislation signed into law. This seems to be especially
pronounced in the case of privacy measures.
To help illustrate the effect different legislation and different
technologies have on privacy, Regan has divided the book into three
main parts: information privacy (credit reports, unlisted phone
numbers, medical information); communication privacy
(wiretapping, e-mail, caller ID); and psychological privacy
(polygraphs, integrity, and honesty tests). The virtually exhaustive
analysis cleverly exposes the way in which information, which many
would have previously considered confidential, is widely available
to the highest bidder and the government. For instance, direct
marketing firms are constantly buying lists that show purchase
histories, association memberships, even credit ratings, all in an
effort to bombard you with personally targeted advertising
campaigns. Regan seems to be suggesting that once the general
public realizes what their "private" information is being used for,
they will understand the need to emphasize the public good of
protecting privacy. Currently, on the direct marketing front, there
is a constitutional battle raging between the marketers' claim of the
First Amendment protection of free commercial speech and the
privacy advocates' search for protection under the Fourth
Amendment. So far, the collective claim of the direct marketers is
wmnmg.
The structure of the book eventually pulls the reader gently over
to Regan's position on the issue of privacy as a societal value. By the
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Supra note 4 at 102.
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end, her persuasive style will have most readers agreeing that now,
amid the growing integration of all forms of technology into our
daily lives, is the time to recognize that privacy should be a
collective value and that privacy values and social concerns are not
antithetical. She recommends this not as a protection against the
threats posed by technology, but because it appears to be the only
way to make privacy interests equitable in society. "Privacy is
rapidly becoming a collective value in that technology and market
forces are making it hard for any one person to have privacy
without all persons having a similar minimum level of privacy."6
In all, for anyone interested in the effects of technology on basic
rights, or the history of privacy legislation, this book is a must read.

6Supra note 4 at 213.

